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Lat6 in 1924, a United States District Court decided that the income
of an employee of a street'railway owned and operated by the City of
Detroit, Michigan, was not subject to the federal income tax.- The
decision excited little if any public interest.. Probably only a small
percentage of the legal fraternity has heard of the decision and a still
smaller one has marked it as of any importance. Yet implicit in the
problem of that case are questions the final answer to which may well
change the whole course of our municipal development and activities,
and may even be a vital factor in the discard or the retention of the
political philosophy upon which our government was founded and by
which until recent years it has largely been guided.
The limited problem of that case was whether a single employee of
a municipally owned street railway system should pay a federal income
tax. The larger problem of which it is a phase, and upon which a
decision must apparently be forced within the next few years, involves
the right of the federal government to tax municipal activities gen-
erally and indeed those of the states themselves, and to the extent that
the right may be declared, the policy of the government in that respect.
And if the right of the federal government so to tax be established, it
seems that the right of the states to impose taxation to the same extent
upon the activities of subordinate divisions of the federal government
and even upon those of the federal government itself must follow.
Doubtless the idea that the federal government can tax. any state
activity or the state any federal activity will come as a shock to the
legal mind. Ever since the decision in McCulloch v. Maryland2 it has
been laid down as a general rule that each government, and by that
'Frey v. Woodworth (1924, E. D. Mich.) 2 Fed. (2d) 725.
(I8I9, U. S.) 4 Wheat. 316.
30 [807]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
term was comprehended the political subdivisions of each as well,
was free from any burden of taxation attempted to be imposed by the
other. The reason given is that the power to tax involves the power
to destroy, and hence such freedom is essential to the continuance of
two sovereignties side by side. The existing decisions bearing on
this question may not be wholly determinative, however, because
the growth of publicly controlled enterprises within the last decade
has been so marked and promises to continue on such a scale that
entirely new factors of policy and of necessity have appeared.
Unquestionably there exists a very real danger if either of these
sovereignties3 possesses.as a nutter of right the general power of
taxation of the activities of the other, whether conducted directly by
the latter or indirectly through its political subdivisions. It has been
declared time and again that if the right to tax at all is conceded, the
right to tax out of existence must necessarily follow; that once the
power to tax is admitted, there is no limitation upon its exercise.
4
The taxing authority, and that is the legislative body, is the final
judge. We need hardly call attention to the many instances in which
a legislative body has attempted to accomplish by indirection what it
well knew it could not do by direction, to prove the danger. Such
instances are far from rare either among the state legislatures or in
Congress. One need go no further back in congressional history than
the two acts intended to regulate child labor among the backward
states, through the exercise in the one case of the interstate commerce
power, and in the other of taxation, to illustrate the point we have in
mind.5 Obviously a ready weapon to accomplish this end would
always be at hand if Congress and the states each possessed the power
to tax any phase of the activities of the other.
6 Nor is it essential
that the tax should be laid with an intent to destroy to have that result.
Where the margin of profit is small or non-existent, as it frequently
is with municipal utilities, a small additional burden would be fatal.
Balanced against this danger, however, is the limitation in the field
of taxation open to each sovereignty if no burden of taxation, however
remote, may be placed upon any activity of its co-sovereignty, and
the assertion which is sometimes made that this doctrine of tax
exemption results in indefensible inequalities. The direct activities of
It will b e understood, of course, that when we refer to two sovereignties we
comprehend that of the United States on the one hand and that of each of the
states on the other.
4 McCdlocZ V. Maryland, suptra note 2, at p. 432; Weston v. Charleston (1829,
U. S.) 2 Pet. 449, 468; Veazie Bank v. Fenno (i869, U. S.) 8 Wall. 533; Collec-
tor v. Day (1870, U. S.) Il Wall. 113, 127; Uvited States v2. B. & 0. R. R.
(1872, U. S.) 17 Wall. 322, 327; McCray v. United Statds (19o4) 195 U. S. 27,
24 Sup. Ct. 769.
A See Haminer v. Dagenbart (i918) 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529; Bailey v.
Drexel Furn. Co. (I922) 259 U. S. 20, 42 Sup. Ct. 449.
6 For a collection of decisions involving statutes in which the revenue from
taxation was a secondary consideration and its social consequence the primary one,
see (1922) 22 CoL. L. REV. 659.
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the sovereignties are not alone tor be considered, for commonly these
public enterprises are conducted through the agency of municipal or
quasi-municipal corporations. Their increase has been notable, and
there is no indication that this expansion has attained its limit. With
the increasing complexity of modern life there is more and more a
tendency to take from private hands those businesses stamped with a
public interest. The reclamation of farm lands, the farm loan bank-
ing system, the activities of the Shipping Board, the industrial develop-
ment at Muscle Shoals and co-operative farm marketing stand on
the federal side of the balance sheet. Against them there is the munici-
pal production and sale of gas and electricity, storage and distribution of
water, operation of urban transportation systems and port and terminal
facilities, and even in some cases, experiments in the general banking
field.
7
The federal government through its Internal Revenue Bureau has
taken the lead in the attack on the scope of the rule of tax exemptibility.
The attorney general prevented its complete overthrow by advising
that the salaries and wages of state and municipal officials and
employees were free from the federal income tax." The Bureau was
not so easily balked, however, and its solicitors evolved an exception to
the general rule by which it is clearly intended to reach as many
incomes derived from municipal activity as possible. As this exception
indicates not only the probable line of immediate conflict but perhaps
throws light upon that of ultimate cleavage, it is well to understand
precisely what it is before a study of the existing decisions is
undertaken.
The solicitor declares that the constitutional limitation recognized
by the opinion of the Attorney General applies only to salaries and
wages earned in the exercise of the governmental functions of a state
or its agencies and not to those earned in its proprietary or private
activities, and as the test to determine what are governmental and what
are proprietary activities, there is taken the distinction which has grown
'At the last session there was introduced in the New York state legislature
a bill to permit the cities of the state generally either to acquire existing public
utilities or to create their own, and within the term are included transportation,
heating, lighting, power and water service, telegraphic and telephonic communica-
tion, and every other public service for which a franchise or consent to the use of
the public streets is requisite. Assembly Bill No. IO3O, Introductory No. 976
(Feb. 13, 1925).
' (1919) 3I Op. Att'y Gen. 441. Congress, by omitting from the Revenue Act
of 1918 the provisions in the earlier act that the salaries or wages of state and
municipal officials or employees should be exempt from income tax, suggested by
implication that it intended to tax such salaries and wages. The Attorney General
of the United States ruled, on the basis of the cases to which we shall later refer,
that the operation of the federal taxing power on such income laid a burden on
the means and instrumentalities by which th6 state exercised its powers, that such
income was clearly beyond the reach of federal taxation and that Congress could
not have intended by the omission of the exemption to tax where it could not
constitutionally do so.
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up in determining the tort liability of the public bodies to individuals.
The distinction is claimed to be based on the rule of South Carolina v.
United States.9 We shall presently point out why we believe that
this case by no means made any such distinction; but, assuming that
it did, there is a fundamental weakness and error in this particular
distinction between governmental and proprietary capacities which
has been exhaustively considered in a series of articles recently
appearing in this Journal.'0 The distinction is wholly illogical, takes
no account of modern conditions and of actual facts, and is explicable
only by the history of its growth. We shall have occasion to consider
how ill-advised this distinction would be if extended to the field of
taxation. Nevertheless, it represents the rule which the Bureau of
Internal Revenue is now attempting to apply."
Congress itself appears to look with favor upon a distinction
between the taxability of certain state or municipal activities and others.
In the Revenue Act of 1924, re-enacting substantially the provisions
of earlier acts, Congress provides that gross income shall not include
"income derived from any public utility or the exercise of any essential
governmental function and accruing to any state, territory or the
District of Columbia or any political subdivision of a state or
territory***." Subsequent clauses assure the freedom from taxation
of any income earned by a utility in form privately owned but actually
accruing to the benefit of a state or municipality.'2 It is particularly
to be noted that the exemption given by Congress is not merely to the
"essential governmental functions" of the state or a municipality but
9 (1905) 199 U. S. 437, 26 Sup. Ct ilo.
z' Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (924-5) 34 .YALE LAW JOuRNAL, I,
129, 229.
'Sol. Op. 152, 11-35-1217. Typical of the application of this alleged exception
to the general rule are the decisions of the Solicitor that the salaries and wages of
officers and employees of a street railway owned and operated by a municipality are
subject to the federal income tax; that the income of employees of a municipal
water works system, of employees of a port commission and of employees of
cafeterias connected with the public schools of the city are subject to the federal
income tax, and incidentally that the nature of the function, whether governmental
or proprietary, is to be determined by federal and not by state decisions (Sol.
Memo. 2232, 111-35-1754) ; and that the transportation charges of a ferry operated
by a county under state authority were subject to the federal transportation tax,
a contention overruled by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v. King County (1922, C. C. A. 9th) 281 Fed. 686, on the ground that the
operation of a ferry was clearly the operation of a public highway and dearly a
governmental activity. It is believed that the Solicitor's opinion first referred to is
the one before the court in Frey v. Woodworth, supra note i, where the Bureau
was overruled, but again on the ground that the operation of a street railway is
the operation of one kind of a public highway, and hence the activity is clearly
governmental. Neither case can therefore be cited as a decision that the distinc-
tion is unsound. See also Treasury decisions cited 38 HARV. L. REv. 797-798,
notes 33-49.
2 Rev. Act, 1924, sec. 213 (b) (7).
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also to public operation of public utilities; whereby Congress and the
Bureau of Internal Revenue seem not to agree upon policy.
13
Now the real importance of these doctrines lies not in the effect
which they have upon the taxpayers presently concerned, but in the
fact that, if successfully urged and logically extended, they make
necessary a complete revaluation of our present ideas on the taxation,
and- eventually upon the feasibility, of municipal activities. If the
compensation paid to employees necessary in the conduct of the activity
is not exempt, neither, under the existing rule, is the property
employed in the activity nor the income from the activity itself, nor
indeed the exercise of the power to conduct that activity, and if the
United States can reach all these phases of the activity when it is con-
ducted by a municipality, it can reach them when conducted by the
state itself, for the exemption rests upon precisely the same grounds ; and
similarly if the federal government can tax such state activities, clearly
the state can tax activities of the same class conducted by the United
States or its political subdivisions, since again the exemption of the
state and of the federal government is co-relative. Furthermore, under
the rule that classification for taxation need be uniform only in the
geographical sense, the rates of such taxation apparently need bear
no relation to the rates of taxation on similar private businesses, and
hence the taxation could be actually destructive.
It may be asked why this result it not desirable-whether the curtail-
ment of municipal, state and federal expansion is not to be desired.
This is not a question which we purpose to answer in any detail. The
national policy in the past has been to let each sovereignty, state or
federal, decide the matter for itself. If it is now desired as a matter
of studied policy to curtail that freedom, the problem should be faced
frankly, and not attacked under the guise of a revenue question. We
are not convinced that it is impracticable, either legally or practically,
to establish a line of demarcation which on the one hand will protect
the freedom of our dual sovereignties, and on the other safeguard
revenue needs. A satisfactory solution will not be found, however, if
each new case is considered on its own narrow facts, as has been the
tendency. The problem is a broad one and must be studied as a whole.
The existing rule is a judicial creation, not an express constitutional
provision. Its restatement, therefore,, is for the bench to make. A
careful examination of the decided cases is warranted, then, both for
the light it will throw on the practical aspects of the problem and to
determine how far the courts are bound to the present rule.
" (1925) For still another distinction see 66 Cong. Rec. 286o-61. Reporting a
bill to refund to the city of Philadelphia Civil War taxes levied on a gas works
corporate in form but actually owned by the city, it was recommended (and
passed) that there be refunded only so much of the tax as related to gas furnished
the municipal departments, for street lighting, etc., and not that relating to gas
sold to citizens. This is neither the Bureau's test (since the whole gas venture
would be proprietary) nor that of the Revenue Act.
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THE DECISIONS
The rule that the public activities of the United States and of the
states are free from taxation by the co-sovereignty was first laid
down by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in one of his great constitutional
decisions, McCulloch v. Maryland.14  The question there presented
was whether the state of Maryland had the right to tax the issuance
of currency by a branch of the Bank of the United States within its
boundaries. Passing first upon the question whether, and deciding
that, the United States had the power to incorporate a hank, he held
the tax unconstitutional not because of any. express provision of the
federal constitution, but from necessary implication. It is important
to follow the reasoning of the Chief Justice because it is the founda-
tion stone of the whole doctrine of tax exemptibility. Summarized,
he argued that the power of taxation was a vital one, concurrently
to 1e exercised both by the states a nd the federal government. Never-
theless, if that of the states could be exercised upon the powers granted
to the United States in the constitution, it would amount to a denial
of the federal powers, and accordingly such state taxation is repug-
nant to the constitution.' 5 The scope of the taxation permitted to
each sovereignty is to be measured by the extent of that sovereignty
and in that way neither under guise of taxation can encroach upon
the proper sphere of the other.'6  It is no solution of the problem to
say that each should have confidence that the other will not abuse
its power if the right of taxation is conceded, for in fact no such con-
fidence existed. If taxation is permissible in slight degree it must be
permissible to any extent whatever.'1 To safeguard our constitutional
4 Supra note 2.
'Ibid. 431: "That the power to tax involves the power to destroy; that the
power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create; that there
is a plain repugnance, in conferring on one government a power to control the
constitutional measures of another, which other, with .respect to those very
measures, is declared to be supreme over that which exerts the control, are propo-
sitions not to be denied."
'Ibid. 429, 430: "If we measure the power of taxation residing in a state, by
the extent of sovereignty which the people of a single state possess, and can
confer on its government, we have an intelligible standard, applicable to every
case to which the power may be applied. We have a principle which leaves to a
state the command of all its resources, and which places beyond its reach all those
powers which are conferred by the people of the United States on the government
of the Union, and all those means which are given for the purpose of carrying
those powers into execution. We are relieved, as we ought to be, from clashing
sovereignty; from interfering powers; from a repugnancy between a right in one
government to pull down what there is an acknowledged right in another to build
up; from the incompatibility of a right in one government to destroy what there
is a right in another to preserve."
11 Ibid. 432-3: "If the states may tax one instrument, employed by the govern-
ment in the execution of its powers, they may tax any and every other instrument.
They may tax the mail; they may tax the mint; they may tax patent rights; they
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system, therefore, the right of taxation by the one sovereignty upon
any power of the other must be wholly denied.
The second case likewise involved an attempt of the state to tax a
federal instrumentality. In Dobbins v. Commissioners,18 the question
was whether county taxes within the State of Pennsylvania might
be assessed upon the captain of a United States revenue cutter for his
office. The same principles were applied. The states were restrained
by such limitations-and here appears what has been accepted as the
general statement of this test-
"as are necessarily implied when the exercise of the right by a State
conflicts with the perfect execution of another sovereign power
delegated to the United States. That occurs.when taxation by a State
acts upon the instruments, emoluments and persons, which the United
States may use and employ as necessary and proper means to execute
their sovereign powers.""0
The commander of the cutter no more than the inanimate property
of the United States could be reached by state taxation, because of the
burden which it would impose. Otherwise Congress would have to
graduate the compensation with reference to its reduction by the
tax, and there could be no uniformity, since the tax by the various
states would differ. Moreover, it would give the states a revenue
out of the revenues of the United States, which was never intended
to be possible.
The third of the leading cases is Collector v. Day.20  There for the
first time the converse of the question presented in the preceding cases
came before the Court, and it was held that the United States was
constitutionally prohibited from imposing a tax upon the salary of a
state officer, a judge. The reasoning of the decision was identical
with that of the earlier decisions, applied this time to assure the
freedom of the state sovereignty from interference by the federal
government. The Court again declared the independence of the two,
governments in their respective spheres, 21 and held that it was indis-
pensable, and therefore:
may tax the papers of the custom house; they may tax judicial process; they
may tax all the means employed by the government, to an excess which would
defeat all the ends of government. This was not intended by the American
people. They did not design to make their government dependent on the states.
Gentlemen say they do not claim the right to extend state taxation to these
objects. They limit their pretensions to property. But on what principle is this
distinction made?
The distinction between property and other subjects to which the power of taxa-
tion is applicable, is merely arbitrary and can never be sustained."
1 (1842, U. S.) I6 Pet. 435.
21 Ib.il. 447.
(i87o, U. S.) ii Wall. i13.
Ibid. 124: "The States within the limits of their powers not granted, or, in the
language of the ioth Amendment, 'reserved,' are as independent of the General
Government as that government within its sphere is independent of the States."
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"that the means and instrumentalities employed for carrying on the
operations of their governments, for preserving their existence, and
fulfilling the high and responsible duties assigned to them in the
Constitution, should be left free and unimpaired; should not be liable
to be crippled, much less defeated by the taxing power of another
government, which power acknowledges no limits but the will of
the legislative body imposing the tax."
The fourth case is United States v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,
Co.2 2 There, pursuant to a statute of the Maryland legislature, the city of
Baltimore was authorized to issue its bonds, the proceeds of which were
to be paid over to the railroad company, in return for which that com-
pany issued a mortgage upon its properties to the city. The federal
government, under one of the Civil War revenue acts, attempted to tax
the interest upon the mortgage which was payable to the city. The
Court held the attempt unconstitutional, and declared again that:
"The right of the States to administer their own affairs through
their legislative, executive and judicial departments, in their own
manner through their own agencies, is conceded... This carries with it
an exemption of those agencies and instruments from the taxing
power of the Federal Government," and held expressly that "A munici-
pal corporation like the City of Baltimore, is a representative not only
of the State, but is a portion of its governmental power. It is one of
its creatures, made for a specific purpose, to exercise within a limited
sphere the powers of the State."2"
But, argued counsel for the government, admitting all this, the act
exempts the city "in the exercise only of functions strictly belonging
to them in their ordinary governmental and municipal capacity."
This exemption was express. It is the identical exemption now urged
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The court passed upon this conten-
tion. It disapproved it. It was purely a matter in the discretion of the
state or of the city to determine whether a given act furthering the
city's commercial prosperity was wise or not and whether the end
to be attained was one which the city properly might undertake by
that means. The United States had no standing to effect a decision
in such a matter. It was purely a local concern.
24
' (1872, U. S.) 17 Wall. 322.
2 1 Ibid. 327, 329.
" Ibid. 330: "The Legislature and the 'authorities of the City of Baltimore
decided that the investment of $5,ooo,ooo in aid of the construction of a railroad,
which should bring to that city the unbounded harvests of the West. would be a
measure for the -benefit of the inhabitants of Baltimore and of the municipality.
This vast business was a prize for which the States north of Maryland were
contending. Should it endeavor by the expenditure of this money or this credit
to bring this vast business into its own State, and make its commercial metropolis
great and prosperous, or should it refuse to incur hazard, allow other States to
absorb this commerce and Baltimore to fall into an inferior position? This was a
•question for the decision of the city under the authority of the State. It was a
question to be decided solely with reference to public and municipal interests.
FEDERAL AND STATE TAXATION
The determinative importance of this declaration of the Supreme
Court in relation to the attack on the rule is obvious. It makes the
state, or the agency to which it has delegated the duty, the one to deter-
mine whether a given undertaking is properly public in its nature,
a determination which after all is the concern of the locality and not of
a separate sovereignty removed, if not opposed, in interest, and cer-
tainly not in a position to appreciate the factors which determine the
need or folly of the step.
We must call attention to one other decision because it squarely
overrules the deduction which had been drawn from the language of
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in the McCulloch case,25 that the property
rights of a governmental agency are subject to taxation where all the
other aspects of the agency and the activity are not.26 In Clallam
County v. United States,27 it appeared that a county in the state of
Washington had attempted to levy its state and county tax upon land
and other physical property of the United States Spruce Production
Corporation, an agency created by the United States government
and incorporated under the laws of the state of Washington to aid in
the conduct of the war by producing lumber for aircraft purposes.
Validity of the taxes was urged on the ground that "taxation of the
property of the agent is not taxation of the means." But, said the court,
28
"..... it may be, and, in our opinion, clearly is, when, as here, not only
the agent was created, but all the agent's property was acquired and
used, for the sole purpose of producing a weapon for the war. This
is not like the case of a corporation having its own purposes as well
as those of the United States, and interested in profit on its own
account."
Treating these as the leading cases, they seem to hold clearly that
any and all of the instrumentalities and agencies, animate and inanimate,
tangible and intangible, which either sovereignty may select or use
for the execution of its powers are to be free from any interference
The city had authority to expend its money in opening squares, in widening streets,
in deepening rivers, in building common roads or railways. The State could do
these things by the direct Act of its Legislature, or it could empower the city to
do them. It could act directly or through the agency of others. It is not a
question to be here discussed, whether the action proposed would in the end result
to the benefit of the city. It might be wise, or it might prove otherwise ..... The
city had the power given it by the Legislature to decide the question. It was
within the scope of its "municipal powers."
'Supra note 2.
'Ibid. at PI. 435: "This opinion does not deprive the states of any resources
which they originally possessed. It does not extend to a tax paid by the real
property of the bank, in common with the other real property within the state, nor
to a tax imposed on the interest which the citizens of Maryland may hold in this
institution, in common with other property of the same description throughout the
state."
"2 (1923) 263 U. S. 341, 44Sup. Ct. 121.
" At p. 344, 44 Sup. Ct. 122.
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through taxation by the opposing sovereignty. As we read these cases
there is no suggestion of any limitation upon the exercise of* these
sovereign powers under guise of taxation by the other. Policy may
dictate the grant of permission for such taxation but there is never an
inherent right to it.
How does this statement of the rule compare with its application in
other cases?
As we might expect, the property owned outright by the one
government may not be taxed by the other.29  So, too, the property
owned by an agency of the sovereign and essential to the accomplish-
ment of its delegated functions is wholly free from such taxation, even
though in form the agency is a private corporation and the tax
attempted to be applied is that levied upon other private corporations."
The bonds issued by the one sovereignty or by its political subdivisions
cannot be taxed directly or indirectly by the other, either in the form
of a tax on the bonds as such31 or upon a capital amount in any part
made up thereof,3 2 or upon the income therefrom.33 In the same way
the agencies selected by the one sovereignty to execute its powers or
perform its functions. are wholly free from taxation except to the
extent permitted by that sovereign, even though they are privately
owned or controlled and, their operations inure to private profit.,
s
Van Brocklin v. Tennessee (i886) 117 U. S. 151, 6 Sup. Ct. 670.
" Clallam County v. United States, supra note 26; King County v. U. S. Ship-
ping Board E. F. C. (1922, C. C. A. 9th) 282 Fed. 95o; U. S. Spruce Prod. Corp.
v. Lincoln County (1922, D. C. Or.) 285 Fed. 388; United States v. Coghlan
(1gig, D. C. Md.) 261 Fed. 425. In the King County case, decided by the Circuit
.Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the Coghian case, there were involved
attempts of Washington and Maryland counties to levy taxes, in the one case on
shipyard property, and in the other upon land, owned by the Shipping Board
Emergency Fleet Corporation. The Fleet Corporation had, of course, been denied
governmental immunity from suit but this was held to have nothing to do with the
right to freedom from taxation, and it was declared that the property was dearly
free from taxation. The Spruce Corporation case involved the situation as the
Clallam County decision. The Clallam County decision specifically approves the
other three. See also Matter of De la Vergne Machine Co. (1925, 3d Dept.) 207
N. Y. Supp. 68o.
' Weston v. Charleston (1829, U. S.) 2 Pet. 449.
'Bank of Commerce v. New York City (1862, U. S.) 2 Black, 620; Bank Tax
Case (1864, U. S.) 2 Wall. 2oo; Banks v. The Mayor (1868, U. S.) 7 Wall. 16;
First National Bank v. Kentucky (1869, U. S.) 9 Wall. 353; Owensboro Bank v.
Owensboro (1898) 173 U. S. 664, 19 Sup. Ct. 537; F. & M_ Savings Bank v.
Minnesota (1914) 232 U. S. 5x6, 34 Sup. Ct. 354; Farmers' & B. L. Ins. Co. v.
Anderson (I925, Kan.) 232 Pac. 592.
'Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1895) 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673.
"4 Osborn v. Bank (1824, U. S.) 9 Wheat. 738; California v. Cent. Pac. R. R.
(1888) i27 U. S. I, 8 Sup. Ct. lo73; Owensboro Bank v. Owensboro, supra note
32; Smith v. Kansas City T. & R. Co. (i92i) 255 U. S. I8o, 41 Sup. Ct. 243.
The Osborn case repeated the situation in the McCulloch case (supra note 2) in
aggravated form, but a new ground of attack apparently was that the bank was
a private corporation whose principal object was individual trade and profit. The
FEDERAL AND STATE TAXATION
Enterprises conducted by the government or its subdivisions directly
are free from any interference by such taxation, even though the tax
rests upon the private citizen benefiting by the activity and not upon
the public body.3 5 When the one government exercises its own right
of taxation, that right is free from any control by the other sovereign.3 6
The rule has even been extended to relieve from taxation bonds ten-
dered by an individual to secure a license from a municipality.
37
So much for the cases in which a tax has been forbidden. How
do the cases in which such taxation was permitted fit in the rule as
we have stated it? The cases in which acts of taxation have been
upheld fall into four classes.
The first class are those in which there was express permission by
one sovereign to the other to levy the tax in question. Obviously, if
a sovereign may prohibit all taxation, it may grant the right to another
power to whatever extent it desires, and that has been done, particu-
larly with respect to national banks, in regard to real property and to
private interest in the governmental agency.38
As to the second class, those in which the government levying the
Chief Justice held that it was not created for these ends but to serve a legitimate
public need and purpose, that the transaction of private business was the source of
compensation for its services to the government, and that "if the trade of the
bank be essential to its character as a machine for the fiscal operations of the
government, that trade must be as exempt from state control as an actual convey-
ance of the public money." (At p. 867.)
The recent Kansas City Title Company case illustrates the limit to which the
rule may be carried. Taxation of the Federal Land Banks and all their instru-
mentalities, including the mortgages and bonds to be issued, was expressly for-
bidden except on the realty which they owned and the property right in their
stock. The act was attacked both on the ground that congress had no power to
create the banks and that the tax exemption was invalid. The court concluded that
since the banks were to be depositaries of public ianeys and purchasers of bonds,
that clearly brought them within the creative power of Congress, even though they
might have many other purposes not within such power if considered separately;
that there was no power to tax the property or franchises of such banks except
to the extent permitted by Congress; that "if the state can tax these bonds, they
may destroy the means provided for obtaining the necessary funds for the future
operation of the banks"; that the court had nothing t6 do with the policy of the
legislation; and accordingly that the legislation in all respects was valid.
' United States v. King County supra note II.
"Lane County v. Oregon (1868, U. S.) 7 Wall. 71, where the United States
made paper currency legal tender while the State of Oregon demanded payment
of state taxes in gold or silver, it was decided that the state law controlled since
Congress had no right whatever to interfere with such an essential sovereign
attribute of the state as the right to collect its taxes as it would.
Ainbrosini v. United States (19o2) 187 U. S'. I, 23 Sup. Ct. i.
'Bank Tax Cases (1865, U. S.) 3 Wall. 573; First National Bank v. Kentucky
(1869, U. S.) 9 Wall. 353; Lionberger v. Rowse (I869, U. S.) "9 Wall. 468;
Mercantile Bank v. New York (1887) 121 U. S. 138, 7 Sup. Ct. 826; Owensboro
National Bank v. Owensboro, supra note 32; Smith v. Kansas City T. & T. Co.
(1921) 255 U. S. 18o, 41 Sup. Ct. 243.
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tax had plenary power over the subject matter, irrespective of taxation,
it is very obvious that where the power of Congress to legislate upon
a subject is paramount and Congress could, by direct action, prohibit
the states from acting in that field, the fact that it accomplished
the same result by indirection,' presents no bar. In such a case, no
burden of taxation rests upon the state in the performance of its
functions, for the activity in which it was engaged was not its own
function but that of the United States.30
In the third class are those cases in which the tax did not rest upon
a public agent at all although the faxpayer asserted that status.
Although there are few of these cases they are of importance because
they indicate a sound line of demarcation between the taxation and
the exemption of agencies engaged in the accomplishment of public
purposes. In two of the cases, the right of the states to levy taxes
upon the real property of transcontinental railroads either chartered
or aided by the federal government was upheld, and the language of
the court may suggest that the railroads were federal agencies of the
same status as the national banks, but that nevertheless, they were
taxable of right to the extent that the tax laid no oppressive burden
upon the execution of the sovereign powers.4 0 So far as those cases
imply a distinction between the taxation of the operations of public
agencies and of the property.which they employ, they are dearly over-
ruled by the recent decisions holding exempt from taxation the property
of the Spruce Production Corporation and the Emergency Fleet Cor-
poration to .which we have already called attention.4 The decisions
are, however, obviously sound because the objects of the railroads
' Veazie Bank v. Fenno (1869, U. S.) 8 Wall. 533. The United States had
levied a tax upon state bank notes used for circulation. The Supreme Court of
the United States held the act valid. The constitutional power to provide for
currency is vested in Congress and Congress was entitled to restrain or regulate
the circulation of other currency in any way it desired.
Thomson v. Pacific R. R. (1869, U. S.) 9 Wall. 579; Railroad Co. v. Penston
(1873, U. S.) 18 Wall. 5. In the Thomson case the court reiterated the ordinary
rule that Congress might in its discretion exempt the agencies employed in the
furtherance of any of its powers from any state taxation, "which would really
prevent or impede the performance of them," but said, "We think there is a clear
distinction between the means employed by the government and the property of
agents employed by the government. Taxation of the agency is taxation of the
means; taxation of the property of the agent is not always, or generally, taxation
of the means." In fact, the decision of the court seems to rest upon a presumed
intent of Congress to permit taxation. For, says the court, "it will be safe to
conclude, in general, in reference to persons and. state corporations employed in
government service, that when Congress has not interposed to protect their property
from state taxation, such taxation is not obnoxious to that objection."
The Penfiston case went further because there four of the eight judges held that
the states had a right to tax such railroad property. They place their decision
upon the remote effect of such a tax, and upon the deplorable result if such were
not the rule, due to the withdrawal of so much property from federal taxation.
, Supra note 28.
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were not in fact primarily to fulfill the sovereign purposes of the United
States, but were to earn profit for the individual stockholders. The
gain to the Federal government was purely incidental and the railroads
were not in any true sense agencies of the Federal government.
42
In the last class is a case standing by itself, South Carolina v. United
States.43 It was there held in substance that where a state invaded
a field (i) therefore wholly reserved to private enterprise (2) upon
which the federal government consistently had levied a tax, which tax
was continuing, and (3) where the element of profit to the state was a
substantial one, the tax was valid. The state could not claim immunity,
because it was not engaged in performing a function which, at the time
the federal constitution was adopted, would have been attributable to
its sovereign nature. The court is very materially influenced by the
fact that the operation was a source of substantial profit to the state
and might well tempt South Carolina and its sister states to enter the
liquor and many other fields of private business under the guise of the
exercise of police power, with the resultant loss to the federal govern-
ment of material sources of revenue. Nevertheless, as its test the
court takes the distinction between activities historically "of a strictly
governmental character" as contrasted with those "of an ordinary private
business." The test which the Bureau of Internal Revenue contends
was laid down by this case, that of the distinction between governmental
and proprietary activities in the tort field, was in fact cited as an anal-
ogy only, and the court always returns to the idea that "whenever a
'In support of this principle, see Veazie Bank v. Fenrto, supra note 39, at pp.
547-8: "It cannot be admitted that franchises granted by a state are necessarily
exempt from taxation for franchises are property, often very valuable and produc-
tive property, and when not conferred for the puwpose of giving effect to some
reserved power of a state, seem to be as properly objects of taxation as any other
property." Compare Weir v. Jaybird Mining Co. (I924, Okla.) 232 Pac. 425.
The correct principle to be applied to such cases is indicated in the decision on
the federal corporation tax, Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., (igio) 22d U. S. 3O7, 31
Sup. Ct. 342. To the objection, based largely on the national bank and the
railroad cases, that the act taxed "franchises which are the creation of the state
in its sovereign right and authority" the court answered that while the original
incorporation was an exercise of the state's power, the purpose of the incor-
poration and the exercise of the charter powers had no public aspect at alL
It was these which were taxed and not the act of incorporation. The bank cases
were distinguished because there the primary purpose of the corporation was said
to be the effectuation of sovereign federal powers rather than the creation of a
private business entity. That the principle of the Flint case is consistent with
the general rule, and does not support a distinction between state and federal
corporations as such, is supported by the declarations of the courts that if there
could be such a thing as a Federal corporation for purely private purposes, that
corporation would be taxable by the states. Osborn v. The Bank, supra note 34,
at pp. 859-862. The explanation is, of course, that the federal government
possesses no general power to create corporations and can charter them only to
further the exercise of the sovereign powers which it possesses.
"' Supra note 9.
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state engages in a business which is of a private nature that business
is not withdrawn from the taxing power of the nation.""
It is beyond dispute that this decision is entirely out of line with all
the other cases which we have examined and the dissent of three jus-
tices, led by Mr. Justice White, is a strong one and far more consistent
not only with the precedents theretofore established but with the many
cases since decided and which we have reviewed above, and with
reason. 45  The best that can be said of this case is that it stands on its
For many years prior to the decision of this case the United States had
collected a license tax from dealers in intoxicating liquors. The State of South
Carolina by statute took over the sale of liquor, establishing dispensaries which
were managed by its own agents and prohibiting sale by all others. Protest was
made against the collection of the federal tax upon these agents of the state,
which, in the exercise of its sovereign power, conducted the liquor business. "The
exemption of the state's property and its function from Federal taxation is
implied from the dual character of our Federal system and the necessity of
preserving the state in all its efficiency. In order to determine to what extent that
implication will go we must turn to the condition of things at the time the Cowsti-
tution was framed. What. in the light of that condition, did the framers at the
convention intend should be exempt? Certain is it that modern notions as to the
extent to which the functions of a state may be carried had then no hold." Then
after a review of some of the cases which we have examined, the court says:
"These decisions, while not controlling the question before us, indicate that the
thought has been that the exemption of state agencies and instrumentalities from
national taxation is limited to those which are of a strictly governmental character,
and does not extend to those which are used by the state in the carrying on of an
ordinary private business."
'Justice White said that while "the ruling made is, from an economic point of
view, a just one," the principle "strips the states of their lawful authority" and
"also endows the states with a like power to divest the government of the United
States of its lawful attributes." Reviewing the authorities, he, decided that the
majority opinion was squarely contrary to the existing decisions* on the principle
"that the state under its police authority" had the right absolutely to prohibit the
sale of liquor or to subject it to such regulations as it deemed proper, and
accordingly that the tax was one on the exercise .of a sovereign power. He
answered the other reasons advanced by the majority. First, as to the plea that
the state derived revenue from the activity, he said of the argument, "if pushed to
its logical conclusion, the far-reaching result of the proposition that wherever
revenue is derived from an act by one government, therefore the other may burden
the agent or instrumentality of the other," is that the states could tax national
banks, post office, the mails, the government transport and many other federal
activities. Nor did he consider the plea of necessity a sound one. While, if
carried to a fantastic extreme as in the illustrations of the majority, the states
might destroy the constitutional system under the exemption claimed, he pointed
out that the alternative was to destroy the constitutional system by the opposite
course, permitting each sovereignty to control the other through taxation, and that
it was more important to avoid the immediate danger than the future and
improbable one. On the argument that the problem was analogous to that of
liability of public agencies for torts in their proprietary capacity, he urged that
the analogy was unsound, but showed that in any case that distinction had not been
approved by the United States Supreme Court, citing Barnes v. District of
Columbia (875) 91 U. S. 540; Workina; v. New York (igoo) 179 U. S. 552,
21 Sup. Ct. 212. Lastly, he refused to accept the doctrine that a constitutional
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own peculiar facts and certainly it has never been followed in the sense
that a similar limitation of the rule has been applied in the tax field. On
the contrary it would seem that a later decision on the South Carolina'
legislation implies a retrogression even in the particular circumstances.-
With a fairly complete review not only of the cases upholding free-
dom of public activities from taxation but also of those in which taxa-
tion was permitted, what can be said of the rule as it is now established
and of the probable or possible future limitations? The rule may be
summarized substantially as follows:
i. It has been consistently held from the first decisions that the
federal and state government respectively are mutually, equally and
wholly exempt from taxation by the other which rests any burden
whatsoever on the exercise of their respective sovereign functions.
This protection covers their municipal and political subdivisions and
even in some instances agencies privately owned and operated, and
extends to property, real and personal, tangible or intangible, owned or
used in their own hands or created by them in furtherance of their pur-
poses (bonds and similar intangible items), to their employees, to their
operations and to every aspect of their activities.
2. Permission is frequently given to the co-sovereignty, however,
for limited taxation, which is usually permitted to rest only on the
physical property of a private agent and upon the private property
interests involved; and even in those cases it is limited to equality with
the taxation imposed upon similar bodies or property interests of the
taxing jurisdiction.
3. Where one sovereign has a paramount power in some field it may
be exercised through taxation as well as by any other means.
4. A private agency existing by virtue of the exercise of the sover-
eign power but not primarily created for or engaged in the perform-
ance of public duties may be taxed, because such taxation is not of the
sovereign or its functions or instrumentalities at all. There seems, how-
ever, always to be a question of fact in such case whether the creation
and functions of the agency are primarily public or not.
limitation could not be applied unless it appeared that the framers of the constitu-
tion could have envisaged the particular situation when that instrument was
adopted. If this argument were sound it would prevent, of course, any regula-
tion of modem instrumentalities not known a century and a half ago.
' Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co. (19o9) 213 U. S. 151, 29 Sup. Ct. 458.
South Carolina repealed its act for the sale of liquor and appointed a commission
to wind up the business. In an action against the commission, the defense was
interposed that the state was the real party in interest and this defense was upheld.
Since the Emergency Fleet Corporation decision (supra note 28) seems to estab-
lish that the tax exemption exists even where freedom from suit does not, the
limitation of this case on the South Carolina decision is evident. The South Caro-
lina case was explained by saying that it dealt with the power of a state to destroy
the pre-existing right of taxation by the United States, whereas this decision only
enforced an exemption from suit existing under the federal constitution when the
dispensary act was passed. At p. 173, 29 Sup. Ct. 465.
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5. One case standing by itself and with a strong dissent has upheld
taxation by the federal government of a state activity which clearly
was the exercise of a sovereign power and duty, but in a field thereto-
fore reserved strictly to private enterprise, and where there appeared
to be a substantial element of profit as a motive for the activity. That
case was later explained by saying that the federal taxation antedated
the exercise of the state's power of regulation.
It seems, therefore, that the rule may be summarized by saying that
every exercise of the sovereign power for its proper and normal ends
in whatever form and through whatever agency, is wholly free from
any burden of taxation levied by the co-sovereignty upon any instru-
mentality or form of the activity.
But in seeking a guide for the future application of the rule, there
is left at issue the question-what are such proper and normal ends?
We can say definitely, of course, that those activities which have been
specifically approved in the cases already decided are such. Is there,
however, no broader and more general guide? We think there is.
Identically the same problem has been presented in determining
whether the exercise or the grant of the sovereign powers of eminent
domain and taxation in a given case were proper. These powers are
attributes of the sovereign only, and their exercise by the sovereign
itself or their grant to others is justified only if the purpose to be
accomplished thereby is a public one. We suppose that few acts of
public authority are more carefully and consistently scrutinized by the
courts than those which fall within these fields. The money of the
public generally must not be taken to be applied for the benefit of
private citizens; the property of one. individual cannot, without his
consent, be devoted to the private use of another. Private enterprise
to accomplish private ends must find its own funds and acquire its
own property and may not tap the sovereign power for these results.
To be within the field in which these powers may legally be exer-
cised, the end to be attained must be one normally the concern of the
sovereign; that is to say, one affecting the public as a body of citizens
and hence properly to be attained through the exercise of the sovereign
powers. These are never permitted to be used to further private ends.4
7
" Olcott v. Supervisors (1872, U. S.) 16 Wall. 678; C. B. & Q. R. R. v. Otoe
Co. (1872, U. S.) x6 Wall. 667; Mt. Vernon W. C. D. Ca. v. Alabama L P. Co.
(1915) 240 U. S. 30, 36 Sup. Ct 234; Rindge v. Los Angeles Co. (i92") 262
U. S. 70o, 43 Sup. Ct. 689; Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Imp. Dist. (1922) 262
U. S. 710, 43 Sup. Ct. 694- As the rule is succinctly stated in the Olcott case,
"That the state might itself make such an improvement (construct a railroad) and
impose taxes to defray the cost, or exercise its right of eminent domain, therefore,
was beyond question. Yet, confessedly it could neither take property nor tax for
such a purpose unless the use for which the property was taken or the tax collected
was a public one." Olcott v. Supervisors, supra, at p. 69i.
Private advantage may, of course, result from the act of the sovereign and may
indeed be the primary object of the individual or body to whom the grant is made.
But from the public point of view this private advantage and object must always
FEDERAL AND STATE TAXATION
In other words, the test is identical with that which we have deduced
for determining when the one sovereign is free from taxation by the
other. This being so, the decisions on the use of eminent domain and
the tax power, having covered a wider range of subjects and problems,
will be helpful in indicating what activities undertaken by the authority
of the one sovereign will be held free from taxation by the other.
The construction of highways-using that term in its ordinary sense
of a i-oute to accommodate public vehicular and pedestrian traffic-is
one of these purposes so imprinted -with the sovereign-or, as it is
called in this field, the public nature, as to justify the exercise of the
powers of eminent domain and taxation.47 9  So is the construction of
bridges and ferries used to convey these highways across water48 and
the improvements of channels for the purpose of navigation-highways
upon water instead of on land. 49  So is the construction of rail-
roads-those instrumentalities of communication and transportation
which are "highways". in the broad legal sense even though they are
normally privately owned and their operations result in private profit.5'
Nor does the fact that the construction is of a siding limited in its
use to one individual always change the purpose to a private one,
since the public has an appreciable interest even in such a limited phase
of commerce.51 Of course, street as well as steam railways are within
the rule.52  By a logical and sound extension of the reasoning in these
cases, all projects which tend to further commercial growth are within
the rule, since they foster the prosperity and well being of the public
generally, though the most immediate and direct result may- be a
private profit. 3
But the public welfare is not bound up with the interchange of
commodities alone. That is only a narrow phase. The production
be subordinate and purely incidental to the public one, and this being so, its exis-
tence does not in the slightest degree affect the right to employ the sovereign
powers.
"7a C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Otoe Co. and Rindge v. Los Angeles Co. .supra
note 47.
"Luxton v. No. River Bridge Co. (1894) 153 U. S. 525, 14 Sup. Ct. 891;
United States v. King County, supra note Ii.
'Hise v. Glover (1896) 119 U. S. 543, 7 Sup. Ct. 33; U. S. v. Chandler-
Dunbar U. P. Co. (1913) 229 U. S. S3, 33 Sup. Ct. 667; Re Rouge River (192o,
E. D. Mich.) 266 Fed. lO5, 113, and cases cited.
0 C. B. & Q. R. R. v. Otoe Co. snpra note 47; Olcott v. Supervisors, supr4
note 47; Pine Grove v. Taccott (1873, U. S.) i9 Wall. 666; Clherokee Nation v.
So. Kan. River Co. (1889) 135 U. S. 641, 1O Sup. Ct. 965; Wisconsin Co. v.
Jacobson (igoo) i79 U. S. 287, 21 Sup. Ct. 115.
" Hairston v. D. & W. Ry. (19o8) 208 U. S. 598, 28 Sup. Ct. 331; Union Line
Co. v. Chic. N. W. Ry. (1914) 233 U. S. 211, 221, 34 Sup. Ct. 522.
' Hendersonville L. & P. Co. v. Blie Ridge etc. Ry.. (1916) 243 U. S. 563, 37
Sup. Ct. 440.
'Mobile v. Kimball (i88o) lO2 U. S. 691; Huse v. Glover, supra note 49;
Cook v. Port of Portland (1891) 20 Or. 58o, 27 Pac. 263; all holding that harbor
improvements were undertaken as proper public functions.
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of commodities is of equal importance, and so, too, are the facilities
for enjoying prosperity when it is attained. Accordingly, it is no sur-
prise to find that the sovereign power may be extended to aid in
drainage" and irrigation5 projects and the creation of a water system
for general public use, 6 all of which bear the obvious impress of
public interest. But the rule goes even further and permits the
extension of such aid to corporations formed to manufacture and dis-
tribute electric power to the public, not merely for light and general
domestic use but for industrial use as well. 7 So too, the establish-
ment of public parks or of forest reservations or of scenic drives and
similar works which furnish healthy recreation to the public, justify
the use of sovereign power.5 s
There are many other activities to further which the use of these
powers of eminent domain and of taxation are justified but which it
is unnecessary to review in detail here.59
The variety and nature of the subjects in which the exercise of these
powers have been permitted suggest the real scope and basis of the
rule. The state may properly bring its sovereign powers into play to
accomplish whatever conduces to the health, the prosperity, the morals
or the general welfare of the public. The exercise of these powers is
by no means limited to matters of necessity; but those of convenience
and even pleasure and recreation are within them. Nor need the result
be a benefit to every individual in the body politic. It is permissible
and frequently necessary to parcel out advantages piecemeal; and it
is sufficient if there is a gain to an appreciable section of the public,
always as citizens, however, and not as individuals.
In short, the state is the guardian of the public welfare, and what-
ever furthers that welfare is properly and normally its concern, and for
the accomplishment of those objects it may exert its sovereign powers.
Orr v. Allen (1917, S. D. Ohio) 245 Fed. 486 (containing an excellent and
exhaustive review of the principles and authorities), affd. (iqi8) 248 U. S. 35, 39
Sup. Ct. 23; Matter of Tuthill (igoo) 163 N. Y. 133, 57 N. E. 303.
'Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley (1896) 164 U. S. 112, 17 Sup. Ct. 56;
East Oregon Land Co. v. Willow River Co. (1913, C. C. A. 9th) 2o4 Fed. 516.
' Pocantico Water Works Co. v. Bird (i8g) i3o N. Y. 249, 258, 29 N. E. 246,
248.
" Mt. Vernon W. C. D. Co. v. Alabama I. P. Co. supra note 47; Washington
W. P. Co. v. Waters (iio, N. D. Idaho) 186 Fed. 572; and cf. U. S. v. Chandler-
Dunbar Co. and the Rouge River cases, supra note 49, and the Hendersonville case,
supra note 52.
Shoemaker v. United States (1893) 147 U. S. 282, 13 Sup. Ct. 361; People v.
Adirondacks Ry. (1899) 16o N. Y. 225, 248, 54 N. E. 689, 696, affd. (igoo) 176
U. S. 335, 2o Sup. Ct. 46o; Rindge v. Los Angeles Co. supra note 47.
' See notes of cases appearing in 33 L. Ed. 740, 4o L. Ed. I88. In addition to
the uses named above, cases are there cited supporting the employment of the
sovereign power for canal, telephone, levee and cemetery purposes and many addi-
tional illustrations of the use of the power in the instances already enumerated
are given.
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But this use of the sovereign power to accomplish a sovereign
function is the very test by which the courts have determined the right"
of one government to freedom from taxation by the other. The
reason for the rules seems identical. Development in the one field
may be expected to follow the growth which already has taken place in
the other. So far as we can predict from analogy, therefore, the
two governments can each expect their ventures in transportation,
terminal and harbor service, improvement of the land, manufacture of
gas and electricity, the furnishing of water, the maintenance of
facilities for recreation and health, and every other activity which
benefits the public as such, to be free from taxation by the other.
THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION
Up to this point we have discussed the question of tax exemption
solely on the basis of existing decisions and a logical development
therefrom. Precedents have been known to be faulty, however, and
growth in the law illogical. Argument from analogy is always weak.
Fundamentally, we believe this rule of tax exemption and the reasons
which have been given for it to be sound; but with the intricacies of
modern constitutional law we are not so sure that the basis of the rule,
its implications and its relations to other problems are thoroughly under-
stood. At an earlier point we have said that there seems to have been
no re-examination of the rule in the light of modern conditions, and
that in default of such re-examination it bade fair to go astray. We
think that such a re-examination is not arduous, that even with the
confusion due to the rapid growth of constitutional law in the last half
century the underlying principles are so well established that they
need only to be stated to be accepted, and that with such recognition
their application will not be difficult.
It must be evident that this question of state and federal tax exemp-
tion is not primarily a revenue problem at all but fundamentally an
economic and political problem. It is twofold in nature. It raises
first the question whether and to what extent the federal govern-
ment and the states may extend their activities into the field of business
operation, either as regulatory measures or for any other purpose.
Secondly, it involves the issue of state and federal relationship, the
conflict of the conceded powers of one with the conceded powers of
the other, the right of either by indirection to control the discretion of
the other when it could not accomplish that result directly. Fortunately
the answers to these questions seem well established.
The first principle which we may regard as settled is that each
sovereign not only has the right, but is charged affirmatively with the
duty, of furthering the welfare of the public by proper action, regu-
latory or otherwise, in those fields affected with a public interest.59a And
those fields broaden with the growth of our economic life. We hold no
"a See supra notes 47-59.
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brief for a socialistic trend of government, but it can hardly be argued
.seriously that in this generation any government can confine its activi-
ties within the limits which were proper 135 years ago. Thd whole
tendency of judicial, and particularly of federal, decision has been to
broaden the right of regulation; and this growth has been based on
a very real necessity as the added complexity of business has added
to the danger of abuse. Not a decade passes without the extension
of the doctrine of the police power, without a new and important lim-
itation upon the due process clause, upholding the rights of the state
or the nation to interfere with business as a part of their regulatory
power and free from the charge of trespass upon property rights in
the constitutional sense.
The second principle is that whether a given field is charged with a
public 'interest is a question of fact in every given case, to be deter-*
mined largely by local conditions.6" The creation of an expensive-
tunnel for the use of a private railroad could not often be a proper
public task, and yet circumstances may justify it.61
The third principle is that once the public interest is established,
how the sovereign shall act to protect or further it is a matter wholly
in its own discretion. It may accomplish the result by regulation-by
statute administered in the normal way, or by a special supervisory
commission- or it may find and determine that the function will not
be properly performed without its own intervention. What form this
intervention shall take it alone may decide-through the advance of
funds, the extension of the aid of its sovereign power, actual operation
by itself. And whatever mode it chooses, it may select the agency by
which it will act-its own officers, municipalities, special commissions
of a public nature, private corporations or individuals. 1a
The fourth principle is that each sovereign is wholly free within its
sphere from any dominion by the other, that neither can accomplish
by indirection what it could not do directly. Our federal system rests
upon this principle and we know of no real deviation from it. It is
the basis of all the decisions that the police power of the states does
not justify state legislation directed at interstate commerce, and also
of this same long line of decisions which we have reviewed, holding
the federal tax power insufficient to affect the reserved powers of the
states.61b
Certainly all these principles should be taken into consideration and
no tax upheld which conflicts with any one of them. Giving due con-
sideration to the principles there still remains a broad range of taxation,
Hairston v. Danville de W. Ry. suprpa note 5I; Rindge v. Los Angeles Co.
supra note 47; Milheinz v. Moffat Tunnel Imp. Dist. supra note 47; Orr v. Allen,
supra note 54.
Milhein v. Moffat Tunnel Inp. Dist. supra note 47.
"a United States v. B. & 0. R. R. Co. supra note 22; see also authorities cited
supra notes 14-37.
'b Supra notes 14-37.
FEDERAL AND STATE TAXATION
open to each sovereign, even in the public field. To begin with, a vital
and fundamental distinction is possible in the nature of the agent
selected by the sovereign to perform its sovereign function. The agent
may be public or private in nature. When it acts through a public
agent, that agent-officer, commission or political subdivision-is
the sovereign itself so far as its relations to the co-sovereign are con-
cerned, and it is entitled to every exemption that attaches to the
sovereign itself.""'
Yet taxation of these private agencies could not be wholly unrestrained.
It must not rest upon them as a class, i. e., as private agencies performing
public duties. When the sovereign function is peformed through an
individual or a private corporation-national -or state banks, railroads,
gas, water and electric companies, corporations operating toll highways
or bridges and all others in the field of public utilities-the exemption
ought to apply so far as the sovereign function itself is involved.
The federal government has no right to prevent or impede the furnish-
ing of gas to a city by discriminatory taxation against a private
corporation. Such taxation would, we think, clearly rest a burden on
the sovereign function of state which authorized the act and that is
precisely the principle of the national bank cases. The taxes attempted
in the McCulloch and the Osborn cases on the Bank of the United
States were intended primarily, and indeed openly, not as revenue
measures but to prevent its functioning as the federal agent. A tax
which in fact rests on the public function, whether because it is dis-
criminatory or because it is generally so oppressive as to prevent proper
performance of the public service, ought to be held illegal and there
should be no unusual difficulty in deciding when the tax falls in the
forbidden class, for the courts are constantly passing on similar
questions.
62
But when the tax levied on the corporation is common to all corpora-
tions and businesses, whether it is on the franchise, the operations,
the property, the income or the salaries of the employees, it then seems
to rest no particular burden on the sovereign function as such. There
has never been any doubt as to this in relation to private corporations
created by the states, and we think that the length to which the courts
have gone in exempting national banks from taxation has an historical
explanation in the hostility of the states in the early days to this form
of federal enterprise, leading to an extreme in protective measures.
Certainly as to all these private corporations performing public ser-
e See cases cited supra notes 14-37.
For example, both the problem and the principle seem to be the very ones
presented by and applied in the cases where it is claimed that a state tax rests 'a
burden on interstate commerce and the court prohibits or permits the particular
tax according as it does or does not in fact constitute such a burden. See Thomas
Reed Powell, State Income Taxes and the Commerce Claise (1922) 31 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 799.
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vices, state and federal alike, there seems no reason why in their
private aspect they should not be taxable as others are.
The second distinction which seems feasible and sound lies in
the nature of the act which the sovereign undertakes. But here it is
necessary to walk warily, for in form this is precisely the principle
which the critics of the rule of exemption advance. Their error is in
their application of the rule, and before suggesting what appears to be
the correct one, we ought to dispose of those which are unsound.
All the recent attacks upon the rule rely upon the South Carolina
case.6 3  As we shall presently show, that decision seems not to stand
for the proposition for which it is usually cited, but its true rule is
equally dangerous. The court was concerned over the tendency
toward public ownership of public utilities, and the prospect of public
embarkation in the sale or the importation of any and all commodities.
It argued that such action would be improper because it would not
have been permissible at the time the federal constitution was adopted
and hence could not be within the purview of that instrument at any
subsequent time. Applied literally, the decision would deny the sover-
eign character to every function not recognized as public in the
eighteenth century. Such a decision, giving no recognition to chang-
ing economic and social conditions, seems explicable only if the court
approached the problem solely as a problem of taxation. Certainly it
would not have applied the same rigorous limitation to other aspects of
public action, for it approved the earlier decision upholding the police
power of South Carolina to control the sale of liquor.6  Accordingly
it must hold that action by the state or nation which would be stamped
with the sovereign nature in every other aspect is of a different nature
for purposes of taxation. The decision seems illogical, inconsistent
with later decisions on the same question, and perhaps expressly limited
by _Murray v. Wilson Distilling Company.65  If the sovereign is ever
free from taxation by the co-sovereign, surely it must be free as to all
sovereign functions, and necessarily, what is a sovereign function in
other aspects of the problem must retain its nature as to taxation,
else the protection of the rule would be lost.
More recent attempts to limit the application of the rule6 6 rest in form
upon the South Carolina decision; but the test which they attempt to
apply is that between the governmental and proprietary capacities of
municipalities in the tort field, a principle for which the South
Supra note 9.
L Ibid. 454, 26 Sup. Ct. 113.
Supra note 46.
"Compare the Treasury Department's opinion, supra note ii. See also address
by Ar. S. Chamberlain before the Section of Public Utility Law of the American
Bar Association, July 7th, 1924; argument by Prof. Edwin S. Corwin of Princeton
reprinted in the Congressional Record for February 9th, 1924, pages 2233-2238;
and the unfavorable comment on the Frey decision, supra note 1, in (1925) 39
HAv. L. REv. 793 and (1925) 25 CoL. L. REv. 653.
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Carolina case by no means stands. The court there called attention
to the tort rule only as an analogy, and the distinction which it applied
is the much broader one just noticed.
.side from all this, the governmental-proprietary distinction is
wholly unsound. Its essential weakness even in the tort field to which
it has heretofore been reserved, has been so ably and exhaustively
treated by Professor Borchard in his article
67 that we need not discuss
it in detail. The doctrine as it has developed would be even more
incongruous in determining the proper sphere of governmental action.
Whatever the philosophical difference between the governmental and
proprietary capacities of public bodies, the distinction actually drawn
is certainly not sound. It makes no recognition of the growing neces-
sity for public control of activities affecting the body of citizens, and
its application has been warped by the desire to accord justice to
individuals suffering from public torts of whatever nature. If the
question were presented de novo, it would be hard to establish a
distinction between the limited safeguarding of public health by the
maintenance of hospitals or a Health Department, which in this field
are declared to be governmental functions,
68 and other acts certainly
as directly connected with and essential to the preservation of health
such as the maintenance of sewers and drains,
9 or of public parks,
70
or of a healthful supply of water for public use.
7 1  It is equally
difficult to see why the use of water for protection from fire is govern-
mental while the use of the same water through the same conduits
under the same control for other purposes is considered private.
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To illustrate the inconsistency even more strikingly, there is no func-
tion more distinctively governmental in every aspect, historical and
actual, than the construction and maintenance of highways. Yet in the
" Borchard, op. cit. supra note io. The origin of the distinction between the
governmental and proprietary capacities of municipal corporations in the field of
tort liability is a wholly illogical one, as Professor Borchard has abundantly
shown. Finding its source in the old doctrine of the personal immunity of an
absolute sovereign from suit, the principle should never have been transplanted in
republican soil. Conflicting with this principle that the sovereign, i.e., the states
and their agents and depositaries of power, the municipalities, could not be sued
and hence in effect were not liable for their wrongs, was the growing humanitarian
tendency of the law to lift the burden of a public wrong from the one individual
against whom it was committed and distribute it over the whole body of citizens
who, through their selected agent, had committed it. This result was accomplished
by inventing a distinction between the governmental acts of municipalities, i. e.,
those they are said to undertake as representatives of the sovereign power and their
proprietary acts, those said to be undertaken by them by virtue of their corporate
personification of a given locality.
Borchird, op. cit. supra note io, at p. 246.
SIbid. 235.
Ibi4. 239.
'Ibid. 252, et seq.
" Ibid. 253-254.
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field of tort liability the courts, with unusual unanimity, declare these
activities to be proprietary in their nature.73  The absurdity of extend-
ing the rule to a field beyond its present bounds is the more apparent
when it. is found that the different courts cannot agree upon the
character in which a municipality undertakes these functions,74 and
that within its present limits the doctrine has been repudiated by the
United States Supreme Court, where the present questions must finally
seek. their solution.7 5 Certainly when the question has been directly
presented whether these same actions were proper sovereign ones-i. e.
when the exercise of the powers of eminent domain or taxation have
been involved-the courts have consistently answered that they were.
Yet there remains an entirely proper distinction based on the nature
of the act undertaken-the true distinction between governmental
(or public) and private acts as contrasted with the illogical distinction
in the tort field. An act is not a sovereign one merely because it is
performed by a public body any more than another function loses its
public nature when undertaken by a private agency. What stamps
a function as sovereign is its relation to the public at large. It must
affect a part of the public, qua public, and must be reasonably essential
to their welfare. The creation and maintenance of a water supply
might usually be such, yet if the system were erected for the purpose
of distributing the water to the, people of anqther state, clearly the
function would not be public. A federal project for the manufacture
of aeroplanes is a sovereign one when it is undertaken in the stress of
war to fill a vital deficiency, and might well be such in peace times if it
were in fact essential to the development of aviation, but if the govern-
ment entered the field in competition with priirate interests competent to
fill all actual requirements, is it not clear that its action no longer would
be stamped with the sovereign nature because no longer supported by
a public need ?76
So what in its inception was a proper public act might in part become
a private one by the extreme to which it was developed; for example,
by overproduction of a service furnished to the public and the dis-
position of the excess in a manner stamping the activity in part with
a private nature. In this connection, it is to be noted, however, that
the United States Supreme Court has held that a suiplusage of produc-
'Ibid. 229.
'In addition to Professor Borchard's article, see (1925) 38 HARv. L. REv. 793,
796, notes 21-25.
'Barnes v. Dist. of Columbia (1876) 91 U. S. 540; Workman v. New York
(9oo) 179 U. S. 552, 574, 21 Sup. Ct. 212, 220.
" The determination whether a given act was public or private as a matter of
fact might present a difficult question of fact but it is an issue which is constantly
determined by the courts. It is, for example, the very question which confronted
the court in all the cases to which we have referred dealing with exercise of the
power of eminent domain and of taxation.
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tion over and above that required to satisfy the public need, does not
in and of itself destroy the public nature of the activity."'
The element of gain might be another important factor. Every
public activity is entitled to be self supporting and indeed profitable,
if it can be made so. The charge for the service is but a special form
of taxation. But the profits might be so large, and the apparent public
need so small, as to justify a finding that the activity was undertaken
not for the public end at all but purely for revenue purposes.
Certainly entry by a public body upon an. activity purely or primarily
for gain has not yet received the stamp of approval as performance of
a sovereign function.
This second test would make no distinction between the state
and its political subdivisions-another point of difference with
the tort rule. Certainly the state has no more the attributes of
sovereignty in a truly private enterprise than has any other body,
while a municipality is no less entitled to the fieedom accorded sover-
eigns than is the state itself when the function performed is a sovereign
one. To hold otherwise would be to deny the state the right, to select
or create subordinate agencies to perform its duties.
These two grounds of exception to the general rule of tax exemp-
tion, founded in the nature of the agent and the nature of the act,
are consistent with the fundamental constitutional principles upon
which the exception rests. They may not be the only ones. We have
said that what is needed is a re-examination of the entire question, and
as a beginning we have endeavored to give the rule as it is pictured by
the existing precedents, the reasons underlying it, its extension so far
as that can be forecast, and such limitations upon it as occur to us,
protecting the revenue needs of the two sovereigns without infringe-
ment on their freedom. The question is too large a one to be covered
exhaustively within the limits of such an article as this. Its import-
ance warrants further extended study."'
' United States v. Chandler-Dunbar W. P. Co. supra note 49; Hendersonville
L. & P. Co. v. Blue Ridge I. R. Co. supra note 52; Re Rouge River, subra
note 49.
A collateral question of equal interest and practical difficulty is that of taxa-
tion within the state upon its own political sub-divisions. These commonly have
been free from taxation but the wisdon or possibility of continuing this course -
with recent developments is now the subject of debate. For example, where
political subdivisions for a special purpose are created, overlapping in the territorial
sense existing municipalities and acquiring valuable properi-y, ought that property
to contribute to the municipal income? A thorough study of this problem has
been commenced in connection with the Port of New York Authority, the terri-
torial limits of which embrace over i8o municipalities and the program of which
may eventually involve the acquisition or creation of property of great value.
The study is in the hands of a commission consisting of seven representatives from
the states of New York and New Jersey of such standing and ability as to insure
confidence in any decision which they may reach. Their report doubtless will be a
valuable contribution to the literature of taxation.
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It is our hope that an- understanding of the rule will remove much
of the hostility to it which has been expressed. That hostility seems
to be based either upon an attempt to extend the field of revenue for
one sovereign or the other, or upon opposition to the principle of
municipal ownership and operation of public utilities which the rule
undoubtedly tends to foster.
There need be no great concern about limitations of the subjects of
taxation. Purposes recognized as public or likely so to be recognized
are not of sufficient importance to constitute a real limitation upon the
field open to the cp-sovereign, and there is no indication that the
ingenuity of the tax authorities is approaching its limit. Any concern
about this phase of the problem must be based upon possibilities which
are so remote as to warrant no real consideration. There is no
likelihood that the Supreme Court will approve such a socialistic inter-
ference with business as to shut off the excise taxes of the federal
government.
Neither does it seem that the question of municipal ownership or
control of public utilities is as closely bound up with this question of
tax exemption as is generally assumed. Unless one accepts outright
the principle that the federal government should dominate the states,
this matter of tax exemption has no place in the discussion of that
debatable and much debated issue. Municipal ownership is a local
issue. Whether it should be undertaken is a question the answer to
which may properly vary with local conditions. Even if its wisdom in a
given case is highly debatable, who should decide it except the locality
immediately involved? The operation is not necessarily removed from
taxation by the co-sovereignty, unless it is a proper public purpose,
and we think that we have shown that mere municipal operation by
itself does not establish this. But even though taxation is prevented
in some instances by the presence of the public interest, is not this a
low price to pay for the mutual independence of states and nation?
It is not amiss to emphasize the fact that the final answer to this
problem is a judicial one. The legislative branch, indeed, may take
the initiative, either in determining upon a particular activity, or on
attempting to levy tax claimed to be objectionable, but it is the court
which will finally decide the propriety of the action. All the prin-
ciples which we have enunciated are judicial ones. None are expressly
included in our constitution. Whether an activity is properly a public
one has time and again been declared to be purely a judicial question,7 9
and the rule of tax exemption which we have studied had its very
inception, not in a clause of the constitution, but in the implications
of that doctrine as spelled out by the United States Supreme Court.
Any modification of the rule which may seem proper lies wholly.
" Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, supra note 55; Hairston v. D. & W.
Ry. supra note 51; Rindge v. Los Angeles Co. supra note 47; Milheim v. Moffat
Tunnel Imp. Dist. supra note 47; Re Rouge River, supra note 49.
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within the jurisdiction of the court which created the rule, and the
only burden resting on its critics is to persuade the court of its error
either in its entirety or in particular application.
We cannot escape the conclusion that the issue in this question
whether the federal government may tax state activities or the states
tax national activities, is the very one upon which the matter was first
decided-that with all the increasing complexity of the questions and
all the changing aspects of its application, the one issue that really
matters is the continued assurance that the states and the federal
government shall each remain free in their respective spheres to
exercise as they see fit the powers that belong to them, and that
there shall be preserved our federal system, the free association of
sovereign states, subordinated to a superior will only in the limited
degree contemplated by the grants of power in the Federal Constitu-
tion. We are still an indissoluble union of indestructible states.
